In saying that “it may be better to translate “self” as “agent” or “agency”, rendering “not-self” as “no-agent” or “no-agency”,” do you claim that we as not-selves have no agency?
On the contrary, we, as not-selves with dependently arising desires, can (and do) have agency, and that agency does not mean that “we are responsible for fulfilling these desires because they are me.” The issue, as you mentioned, is that we falsely identify ourself as our desires. What’s needed is to see that all desires, agency, and our very self are all dependently arisen and empty of inherent existence. Is this not what “no self” really means?
I'd say we don't have agency in the way we normally think we have agency. On most people's scales, I think that the degree of agency we have would fall closer towards the complete determinism side than the free will camp (using these terms in a casual, non-technical sense here). So for that reason, it makes more sense to speak against the notion that we have agency than to bolster it. The way I see it, the agency we have is relegated to assenting to, rejecting, or ignoring arisen phenomena. And in some sense, that may just collapse to rejecting as our only form of control. Compared to compatibilism or determinism, that may as well be complete free will. But compared to the standard conception of agency, in which I actually make active, positive choices about what I want to do, as if conjuring up my thoughts out of nowhere, then it is practically complete determinism.
>What’s needed is to see that all desires, agency, and our very self are all dependently arisen and empty of inherent existence. Is this not what “no self” really means?
I hesitate to agree or disagree because I don't think no self is a propositional concept, but is rather more like riding a bike. If someone asked me "does riding a bike mean pedaling and balancing?" then in some sense, the answer is yes. But if they then took it to mean that they know what riding a bike "means" in an embodied, contextualized sense even without having ever actually ridden a bike, then they would be missing the mark. So I think what you said is a pretty solid description of it. Is it the meaning? I think it would depend how it relates to your experience and embodied understanding. And I suppose that, from that, the meaning is simply that experience and embodied understanding. My latest article about the fish and the marine biologist touches on this, noting how our standard conception of propositional knowledge carries self and permanence views with it, but should be seen as second order embodied know-how.
This is what I was talking about in terms of verbal representations of not-self that ultimately mean the same thing appearing different. But the flipside is that two descriptions can sound the same but mean different things for each person. To me, what you said sounds pretty on point, but that could be because I don't understand not-self well, or you don't understand not-self well, or we both don't understand not-self well.
I think what's tripping me up here is your use of "really". But yeah, short answer long, I think I agree with what you said.
In saying that “it may be better to translate “self” as “agent” or “agency”, rendering “not-self” as “no-agent” or “no-agency”,” do you claim that we as not-selves have no agency?
On the contrary, we, as not-selves with dependently arising desires, can (and do) have agency, and that agency does not mean that “we are responsible for fulfilling these desires because they are me.” The issue, as you mentioned, is that we falsely identify ourself as our desires. What’s needed is to see that all desires, agency, and our very self are all dependently arisen and empty of inherent existence. Is this not what “no self” really means?
I'd say we don't have agency in the way we normally think we have agency. On most people's scales, I think that the degree of agency we have would fall closer towards the complete determinism side than the free will camp (using these terms in a casual, non-technical sense here). So for that reason, it makes more sense to speak against the notion that we have agency than to bolster it. The way I see it, the agency we have is relegated to assenting to, rejecting, or ignoring arisen phenomena. And in some sense, that may just collapse to rejecting as our only form of control. Compared to compatibilism or determinism, that may as well be complete free will. But compared to the standard conception of agency, in which I actually make active, positive choices about what I want to do, as if conjuring up my thoughts out of nowhere, then it is practically complete determinism.
>What’s needed is to see that all desires, agency, and our very self are all dependently arisen and empty of inherent existence. Is this not what “no self” really means?
I hesitate to agree or disagree because I don't think no self is a propositional concept, but is rather more like riding a bike. If someone asked me "does riding a bike mean pedaling and balancing?" then in some sense, the answer is yes. But if they then took it to mean that they know what riding a bike "means" in an embodied, contextualized sense even without having ever actually ridden a bike, then they would be missing the mark. So I think what you said is a pretty solid description of it. Is it the meaning? I think it would depend how it relates to your experience and embodied understanding. And I suppose that, from that, the meaning is simply that experience and embodied understanding. My latest article about the fish and the marine biologist touches on this, noting how our standard conception of propositional knowledge carries self and permanence views with it, but should be seen as second order embodied know-how.
This is what I was talking about in terms of verbal representations of not-self that ultimately mean the same thing appearing different. But the flipside is that two descriptions can sound the same but mean different things for each person. To me, what you said sounds pretty on point, but that could be because I don't understand not-self well, or you don't understand not-self well, or we both don't understand not-self well.
I think what's tripping me up here is your use of "really". But yeah, short answer long, I think I agree with what you said.